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Abstract
This article analyzes the Ambalat territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, viewing from 
the perspective of Indonesian foreign policy in the Post-New Order era. The writer argues that 
Ambalat is a typical case in which Indonesian foreign policy had been widely influenced by public 
pressures which force government to take a firm stance against Malaysia. The practices of democratic 
system, including free media, have become an important factor behind such firm stance, along with 
the growing nationalism amongst public in the Post-New Order Indonesia. However, in relations with 
the willingness to maintain a regional influence in ASEAN, the government actually does not really 
intent to involve in an open war.
Keywords: territorial dispute, foreign policy, democracy, nationalism, ASEAN 
centrality.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Territorial dispute in Ambalat gains a wide attention in Indonesia, 
especially after several military incidents between Indonesia and Ma-
laysia in 2005. Ambalat itself is a sea block in the Celebes Sea, only 
some kilometres off coast of Tarakan City, East Borneo province. Geo-
graphically, Ambalat is located on the borders of Indonesia and Malay-
sia, making each of them claiming it as its territory.  
The Ambalat and East Ambalat Block, each of them covering area 
of 10,750 km2 and 4,739 km2, are economically strategic as they pos-
sess massive amount of oil (421.61 million barrel) and natural gas (3.3 
trillion cubic feet).1 It is therefore the Indonesian Government gave ex-
ploitation concessions to Italian oil company ENI in 1999 and Ame-
rican company Unocal in 2004. Conflict started at 16 February 2005 
when Malaysian Government gave exploration concessions to Shell 
* The author as a lecturer in the International Relations Department, Faculty of Social 
and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia. He obtained M.A and Ph.D Degrees 
in the Political Science Department, Graduate School of Hosei University, Tokyo.
1 Melda Kamil Ariatno, “Ambalat Milik Siapa?” (“Who Own Ambalat?”), on Kompas 
daily newspaper, 8 March 2005
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(British/ Dutch company). 
Unfortunately, both Indonesia and Malaysia responded the issue 
by military might. After Malaysia rejected Indonesian diplomatic note, 
tension consecutively rouse. At 3 March 2005, Malaysian Super King 
Aircraft crossed Indonesian border twice in the waters of Tarakan, East 
Borneo. This reconnaissance aircraft even  crossed and manouvered 
over three Indonesian warship for 10 minutes (KRI Nuku, KRI Wirat-
no, and KRI Rencong), the latter was on task force duty on the waters. 
Indonesian government responded by building a lighthouse in Karang 
Unarang, a coral reef within the area appointed as a new basepoint after 
the lost of Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to Malaysia.2  
At 10 April 2005, tension reached its peak. Provocation between 
the two navies resulted in the colliding of Indonesian warship of KRI 
Tedong Naga and Malaysian KD Rencong for three times. The incident 
grew anxiety as they might get worse into a gunfire. If it was the case, 
in practice Indonesia and Malaysia would be in war.
Indonesian policy in Ambalat case is extraordinarily exceptional. 
After the pitfall of New Order in 1997-1998, there was no single border 
case resulting in mobilization of military might but Ambalat. Moreover, 
it is only the Ambalat case that warships performed dangerous manou-
vers and provocation nearly broke into a state of war. 
Indonesian response here is different from, for example, its respon-
se to the Tanjung Berakit incident in the waters of Bintan, Riau Islands 
province, in August 2010. The incident involved the detention of 7 
Malaysian fishermen by Riau Islands Officers of Marine and Fishery 
Affairs (the DKP) and  3 DKP officers by Malaysian water police. Far 
from military clash, both Indonesia and Malaysia resolved the case by 
diplomatic channel and clarification, in which both parties sent their 
‘custody’ home.3 The Ambalat is also different from Camar Bulan case 
2  Yophiandi Kurniawan, “Protes Indonesia atas Ambalat” (“Indonesia Protests on 
Ambalat”), last modified at 27 February 2005, retrieved from http://www/tempoin-
teraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/02/27/brk,20050227,id.htm  at 28 August 2013, 05:22 
PM
3  “Insiden Tanjung Berakit Tidak Bisa Diproses Hukum” (“Tanjung Berakit Incident 
Cannot Be Legally Processed”), last modified at 17 August 2010, retrieved from http://
www.antaranews.com/berita/216617/insiden-tanjung-berakit-tidak-bisa-diproses-hu-
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in the borders of West Borneo in October 2011. The incident involved 
allegation that Malaysia removed border markers to Indonesian side, 
yet it ended with no military manner. Response to Ambalat case is far 
from what Indonesian public continuously accuses their government 
stances to Malaysia of being indecisive, too lenient, hesitant, and com-
promised.4
Therefore, it is important to learn on Indonesian policy toward Am-
balat dispute. Indonesian firm stances here, as a foreign policy, show 
that there is a special treatment unfound in any other border cases. The 
paper seeks to identify factors affecting this particular Indonesian po-
licy. Some questions brought here are:  (1) How to explain Ambalat 
dispute from the perspective of foreign policy decision making in the 
post-New Order Indonesia?; and (2) What kind of factors influencing 
Indonesia’s firm behavior on the case?
This article consists of several parts. First, the dynamics of Indone-
sia-Malaysia relations would be highlighted, especially on the ‘emo-
tional’ element influencing the two countries’ sentiment. Second, Am-
balat dispute is put in the domestic context of Indonesian foreign policy 
decision making, especially in regards to the flourishing nationalism 
and democratization in the post-New Order Indonesia. Third, it dis-
cusses the significance of Ambalat to the direction of Indonesia’s post-
New Order foreign policy, namely the “ASEAN Centrality” principle. 
Fourth, this paper would end with conclusion.
II.  EMOTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND 
MALAYSIA
Indonesia-Malaysia relations, although belong to the same cultural 
and racial lineage (widely known as negara serumpun), do not always 
go smooth. Both harmony and conflict draw pictures of relations among 
kum  at 30 August 2013, 08:00 PM
4  Pinckey Triputra, “Inferioritas Indonesia: Framing Analysis Hubungan Indonesia 
dan Malaysia dalam Media” (“Indonesian Inferiority: Framing Analysis on Indonesia-
Malaysia Relations on the Media”), in Evi Fitriani (ed.), Hubungan Indonesia-Ma-
laysia dalam Perspektif Sosial, Budaya, Negara, dan Media: Kasus Perbatasan dan 
Pekerja Migran (Indonesia-Malaysia Relations in Social, Cultural, State, and Media 
Perspective: Border Issues and Migrant Workers) (Jakarta: UI Press, 2012), p. 192
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the two countries, spanning from annexations, territorial disputes and 
regional arrangement to economic relations and cultural claims. On cer-
tain extent, it is safe to say that rivalry among neighboring countries, 
like Japan and China, is continuously existed between Indonesia and 
Malaysia.
Historically, as two sovereign nations, Indonesia and Malaysia 
started their relations in harmonious manner. In the early Malaysian 
independence (1957), Indonesia was the first country outside the com-
monwealth nations to establish its representative office. A year later, 
both countries also signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cultural Agree-
ment, which became the Malaysian first friendship agreement after its 
independence.5 
Paddles on both countries relations started to appear in the first half 
of 1960s. Indonesia-Malaysia relations reached its lowest point when 
Indonesian president at the time, Soekarno, launched politics of Kon-
frontasi with Malaysia in the early 1960s. In the meantime, Indonesia 
felt insecure with Malaysia’s attempt to integrate Singapore, Serawak, 
Sabah, and Brunei into its federation. Growing with past background 
of continuous confrontation with ruling colonials, President Soekarno 
alleged Malaysia as ‘agent of neocolonialism’ aiming to annex regions 
which should claim self-determination status. He was clearly suspicious 
on British manouver behind Malaysia’s action. Soekarno, underlining 
the importance of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as his ultimate 
political goals, put Malaysia as target of his ambitious foreign policy. 
Soekarno even made the famous slogan Ganyang Malaysia (Crush Ma-
laysia). Such charismatic Soekarno is surely in the heart of many Indo-
nesians that the slogan is always raised in every conflict with Malaysia 
nowadays, including the Ambalat in the post-New Order era. 
After Soekarno lost his power, harmonious relations started to flour-
ish through the establishment of Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) in the middle of 1960s. As both countries are its found-
ing father, harmony in both countries are necessarily central to reach 
5  Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), pp. 1-2, as cited in Evi Fitriani, “Evolusi 
Hubungan Indonesia-Malaysia” (“Evolution of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations”), in 
Evi Fitriani (ed.), Op. Cit., pp. 21-22
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ASEAN’s ultimate goal of stable and peaceful region. Economically, 
both countries also started growing close ties. In 2005, trade in both 
countries reached US$ 5.5 billion and in 2008, it even reached US$ 
15.3 billion.6 After Singapore, Malaysia is Indonesia’s largest trading 
partner in Southeast Asia. Malaysia also becomes source of foreign di-
rect investment amounting to as much as US$ 407.6 million in 2006.7
Among this growing interdependence however, Indonesia-Malaysia 
relations become too emotional as it comes to migrant worker issue. 
Tension in this sector is caused by development gap among the two 
countries. “The poor Indonesia” and “the rich Malaysia” have become 
both push and pull factors of workers migrating from the former to 
the latter. This becomes more complex as Indonesian workers can only 
access on uneducated or low skill jobs, such as plantation labors, con-
struction workers, and housemaid. This turns to perception gap among 
the two countries, constructed as subordinate relations of ‘labor’ and 
‘employers’.8 Thus, it is no wonder that there are so many cases such as 
abuses of labors by their employers, labors killing his/ her employers, 
and so on. The abuse of Indonesian female migrant worker Nirmala 
Bonat in 2004 and death sentence to 78 Indonesian workers in 2011 are 
some of the most refered cases to describe this emotional relations.
Another issues gaining tension is the unilateral claim of cultural 
product. As negara serumpun, it is no wonder that there are cultural 
similarities among the two countries, such as traditional song, clothes, 
dances, foods, and so on. However, there are growing perceptions that 
Malaysian arrogantly uses those cultural symbol for their own sake. In 
2007, Indonesian medias constructed that Malaysian unilaterally recog-
nized the Rasa Sayange song (from Indonesian province of Moluccas), 
Reog dance (from Ponorogo, East Java), and Batik clothes (from Java 
6  Statistik Perdagangan Luar Negeri Indonesia, Ekspor, Jilid I 2006 (Indonesian For-
eign Trade Statistics, Export, Part I 2006) (Jakarta: BPS, 2006), p. xiv and Statistik 
Perdagangan Luar Negeri Indonesia, Ekspor 2008, Jilid I (Indonesian Foreign Trade 
Statistics, Export 2008, Part I) (Jakarta: BPS, 2008), p. xiv
7  Retrieved from www.bkpm.go.id  at 16 April 2013, 7.00 AM
8  Syamsul Hadi, “Persoalan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Malaysia dan Pentingnya Re-
orientasi Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia” (“Indonesian Migrant Worker Issues and 
The Importance of Reorientation on Indonesian Economic Development”), in Fitriani 
(ed.), Op. Cit., p. 75
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and Sumatera) as its own. Public anger grew even more as Malaysian 
government used the Pendet dance from Indonesian resort island of 
Bali as its tourism icon. 
Territorial disputes are another obstacles. As adjacent countries, 
there are so many areas belong to such, both on the land and the sea. 
Most of them are located along the land borders in Borneo islands and 
waters of Malacca Straits, Riau Islands, and Celebes Cea. In the last 
area, Indonesian public has yet to forget the lost of Sipadan and Ligi-
tan Island to Malaysia. Running tough negotiation since 1960s, Joint 
Committee from both countries and High Commission from ASEAN 
failed to conclude any deals.9 This made them to undergo legal action, 
in which in 2002 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that 
Malaysia has full sovereignty on the two islands based on effective oc-
cupation status. The case causes deep bitterness among Indonesian and 
still lingers on the following territorial disputes, especially on Ambalat 
in 2005.
III.THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM
An important variable to analyze the Ambalat dispute is the de-
mocracy factor growing in the Post-New Order Indonesia. Previously 
within the grip of authoritarian rule where President Soeharto became 
the most dominant power, democracy marked the beginning of freedom 
and plurality on contemporary Indonesia. Starting from reform in 1997-
1998, Indonesia has been transforming its political system, especially 
on the establishment of institutional democracy by creating political 
parties (multiparty system), supporting free and independent media and 
non-governmental organization, conducting national election, strength-
ening legislative roles to control the executive, and so on. In this era, 
democracy has brought euforia of freedom especially on the freedom of 
information, opinion, and political participation, which sometimes lead 
to extreme direction. 
Such euforia affects directly to decision making of public policy. 
Political actors are increasingly plural so that decision making can no 
9  Fitriani, “Evolusi Hubungan Indonesia-Malaysia” (“Evolution of Indonesia-Malay-
sia Relations”), Op. Cit., p. 40 and 49-50
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longer be monolithic nor unilateral. In the context of Ambalat dispute, 
such public dimension has significant influence on the government’s 
firm stance. It is as President SBY has been forded to follow public 
angers, that gave him no choice other than firm and ‘confrontational’ 
stances. 
Government policy at that time was therefore cannot be detached 
from the growing negative sentiment among societies. There were so 
many demonstrations against Malaysian activities in Ambalat during 
March-June 2005, as seen in big cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Yo-
gyakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Solo, Pekanbaru, Ambon, Medan, and 
Makassar. In some cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar, some 
groups even established command posts using the Ganyang Malaysia 
as its name to register volunteers willing to be combatant as soon as 
war in Ambalat starts. In Makassar alone, there were 3,800 volunteers 
in March 2005, including former Indonesian Ambassador to United 
Kingdom  and brother of former President B.J. Habibie, Fanny Ha-
bibie. There were also some groups committing on internet hacking 
on various Malaysian ministries, bodies, organization, and universities. 
This particular issue rouse a distinct perception of threat on Malaysian 
sovereignty in digital era.10
The Ambalat dispute itself was not only happening in 2005. In Feb-
ruary 2007, tension rouse again as Malaysian warship entered Indone-
sian waters for three times and even moved as close as 300 yard from 
baseline. At 7 March 2007, there was an incident in which Indonesian 
fishermen was guarded to exit Ambalat Block by Malaysian warship.11 
In March 2009, more incidents happened as Malaysian warship and 
helicopter entered Ambalat waters at various times. Those incident are 
practically followed by harsh reaction from Indonesian side. Demon-
stration in front of Malaysian embassy in Kuningan district, Jakarta is 
10  Compiled from Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, Dances with Garuda: Malaysia-Indonesia 
Bilateral Relations (Kuching: UNIMAS Publisher, 2013), pp. 161-162
11  “Mily Chief Denies Tightening Security in RI-Malaysia Border Areas”, retrieved 
from  http://www/antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/3/2/mily-chief-denied-tightening-secu-
rity-in-ri-malaysia-border-areas/  at 17 December 2007, 06:05 PM and “Malaysian 
Warships Chase Away Indonesian Fishermen from Ambalat”, retrieved from http://
www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/3/7/malaysian-warships-chase-away-indonesian-fish-
ermen-from-ambalat/  at 17 December 2007,  05:58 PM
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a daily show whenever tension arises. In many times, demonstration 
goes anarchic and, in the view of Malaysians, goes too far as it includes 
flag-burnings. 
Not only the so called people in the streets, other ‘formal’ stake-
holders also showed stern reactions. The military also took part, in 
which the most influential bodies within them, the Indonesian Army 
(TNI AD), expressed their readiness to deploy forces in Ambalat. As 
stated by Army Chief Joko Santoso, the Indonesian Army saw Ambalat 
dispute as a violation on Indonesia’s soverignty. However refering to 
its function within democratic state, Santoso expressed that his institu-
tion would adhere to any political decision taken by the president.12 
Meanwhile the parliament members, triggered typically by the desire 
to gain public sympathy by taking advantages of sensitive issues, also 
expressed their tough stance. They said that they provided political 
support to mobilize large number of army in Ambalat.13 One of them, 
Djoko Susilo stated that ‘firm stances’ and ‘forces deployment’ should 
be delivered to emphasize Indonesia’s integrity in Ambalat. Moreover, 
another parliament member, Yorrys Raweyai, also supported the ‘con-
frontation as long as it is necessary’.14 Such members stances have been 
carried out to the parliament’s stance as whole, whereas in June 2009 
there were five representatives from the Commission I of Indonesian 
House of Representative to conduct official visit to Malaysian parlia-
ment in order to emphasize the former’s claim over Ambalat.15
12  “KSAD: TNI AD Siap Dikirim ke Ambalat” (“Army Chief: Army Ready to De-
ploy in Ambalat”), last modified at 8 March 2005, retrieved from http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2005/03/08/05557639/KSAD-TNI-AD-Siap-Dikirim-ke-Ambalat at 30 
August 2013, 5:23 PM
13  “DPR Beri Dukungan Politik Pengerahan Pasukan TNI di Ambalat” (“Parliament 
Gave Political Support for Army Deployment in Ambalat”), last modified at 5 April 
2005, retrieved from http://news.detik.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2005/bu-
lan/04/tgl/05/time/181637/idnews/335290/idkanal/10  at 30 August 2013, 05:10 PM
14  “Pemerintah Masih Kompromi Tangani Kasus Ambalat” (“Gov Still Compromises 
on Ambalat”), last modified at 5 March 2005, retrieved from http://www.tempo.co/
read/news/2005/03/05/05657536/Pemerintah-Masih-Kompromi-Tangani-Kasus-
Ambalat  at 30 August 2013, 5.00 PM
15  “Di Depan Parlemen Malaysia, Komisi I DPR Tegaskan Ambalat Milik RI” (“In 
Front of Malaysian Parliament, Commission I of House of Representative Empha-
sized Indonesia’s Possession on Ambalat”), last modified at 9 June 2009, retrieved 
from http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2009/06/09/078180923/Didepan-Parlemen-
9 Volume 12 Number 1 October 2014
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
In a certain degree, harsh stances taken by various stakeholders in 
society actually reflected the growing nationalism in Indonesia after the 
New Order. After the pitfall of Suharto regime in 1997-1998, Indonesia 
has been undergoing many humiliating drama putting it on underdog 
and even inferior position. The economic crisis in 1997-1998 caused 
profound economic impact in the society, such as the continuous de-
clining of Indonesian currency, prolonged economic intervention by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), widespread poverty and unem-
ployment, and ethnic conflicts. Democratic euforia in this era has also 
strengthened the disintegration sentiment in various provinces, as seen 
in Aceh, Papua, the Moluccas, and even Riau. 
Indonesians were in general shaken when the East Timor residents 
voted to disintegrate in the referendum of 1998.16 The lost of Sipadan 
and Ligitan Island to Malaysia in 2002 gave subsequent shock and 
worsened collective wounds within the society. In such situation, there 
was a growing psychological mood that Indonesia is in the process of 
collapsing. Accumulated disappointment, more problems from one to 
another, and the seemingly incapacitated democracy bringing no solu-
tion have made public in high frustation.
Indonesian media are not unsuccessful in catching such public feel-
ing. In fact, they do more than just reporting the ‘objective’ realities 
regarding perception and responses of various Indonesians. Media itself 
has a distinct power to make public opinion. By doing the reporting, 
interviews and the like, they construct the people on the weak Indonesia 
and the incapable government.17 Regardless on the importance of media 
within democratic life, it is also a reality that it has worsened feeling of 
‘inferiority against them’ among the society.
In this light, it is no wonder if the Ambalat dispute in 2005 sparked 
many harsh reponses from various stakeholders. The case should not 
be seen as a single event, rather it is part of series accumulating from 
previous events. Harsh stances actually reflected society’s deep disap-
pointment since the beginning of Reformasi, which then be ‘channeled’ 
Malaysia-Komisi-I-DPR-Tegaskan-Ambalat-Milik-RI  at 30 August 2013, 5:10 PM
16  Eko Arnada, “Diplomasi atau Perang?” (“Diplomacy or War?”), at Jawa Pos Daily 
Newspaper, 16 March 2005
17  Triputra, Op. Cit., p. 165
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externally to ‘public enemy’ called Malaysia. 
The presence of Malaysia as ‘public enemy’ among this very unique 
momentum triggered harsh stances on Ambalat dispute. As explained 
before, Malaysia was perceived so negatively as it was described as be-
ing arrogant on migrant workers, culltural claim, and territorial dispute 
issue. Public could point their finger on the Sipadan and Ligitan case, 
in which many comment that it must not be happening again the future. 
Therefore, it is understandable that they cannot accept argument deliv-
ered by Malaysian government on Ambalat dispute. It was reported that 
after the inclusion of Sipadan and Ligitan island into Malaysian federa-
tion, it needed to redraw its baseline by incorporating Ambalat block. 
For Indonesian public, such argument reflected another Malaysian ar-
rogance and Indonesia’s erroding national sovereignty.18 
By this logic, it is not a surprise to see that Indonesian society collec-
tively showed the strengthening of nationalism during Ambalat dispute. 
Harsh statements, demonstrations, and establishment of comand posts 
were its concrete manifestation. Nationalism is basically an existence 
of collective loyalty among societies within a nation. It enables them to 
share common perception and solidarity and consequently takes com-
mon responses and actions.19
It is this nationalism factor that finally transformed by the elite into 
military action to Ambalat block. The revival of nationalism among In-
donesian has become ‘coercive’ instrument to make their government 
respond in line with it. In this point, military option was taken because 
of domestic pressure. As mentioned before, Indonesian government 
then took a response far from its usual manner of diplomacy and being 
lenient in dealing with international issues.
In different point of view, such response was not only caused by 
domestic pressures alone, as the political elite, in this regard President 
SBY, had his own interests in Ambalat issue. By committing military 
manouver, Presiden SBY hoped to gain popularity among his people. 
18  Territorial dispute issue, regardless of its connection to other following events, is 
indeed such a sensitive issue that will triger sentiment of nationalism. The issue di-
rectly hit the national sovereignty principle and meet perfectly with the national pride 
feeling, self-esteem, and we-feeling.
19  Yaakub, Op. Cit., pp. 135-136
11 Volume 12 Number 1 October 2014
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
It is clear that Ambalat dispute was used to divert prolonged domestic 
social, economic, and political problems. At the beginning of his ten-
ure, President SBY faced severe criticisms due to the slow reponses 
toward earthquakeand its huge victims in Aceh and increasing unem-
ployment and inflation, as well as tight political pressures from opposi-
tion groups. This made his government to be unpopular among public. 
Ambalat dispute, therefore, had the very motive to increase President’s 
image by taking nationalistic action.20
The leveling up of nationalism after it reached low point on the 
economic crisis 1997-1998 was a positive sign to solidify support for 
the ruling regime, which at the meantime prepared an economically 
unpopular policy, namely rising of the fuel prices. At the meantime, it 
can be seen that critics from opposition and observers were drowned by 
emotional nuances brought about by the Ambalat dispute. 
In the light of Indonesia’s territorial inferiority after the lost of Si-
padan and Ligitan, during Ambalat case President SBY tried to signal 
that Indonesia is in no hesitancy to use military might to defend its 
integrity. Such action also gave message to domestic separatists, espe-
cially those in Aceh and Papua, that the central government is also in no 
hesitancy to take firm measures against them.
Therefore, it is understanable that President SBY chose to take firm 
response. In the next development, such response was not only mani-
fested in military manouver alone. President SBY himself joined in a 
warship to patrol Ambalat. He also showed more seriousness by in-
creasing national defence budget as much as Rp 1.7 trillion in May 
2005. In December 2005, Indonesian military conducted marine secu-
rity training involving 40 warships sailing from Surabaya to Celebes 
Sea through the strait of Makassar. In 2006, defence budget was raised 
again from Rp 21.6 trillion to Rp 24 trillion.21 All those actions showed 
firm responses by Indonesian government on Ambalat dispute.  
20  Ibid., p. 163
21  Ibid.
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IV. AMBALAT DISPUTE AND ASEAN CENTRALITY PRINCIPLE 
OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY
From a different point of view, Indonesia’s response toward Am-
balat dispute cannot be detached from the principle of “ASEAN Cen-
trality” that strongly substantiated the Indonesian foreign policy. The 
principle has actually grown since the New Order era and but still ap-
ply until nowadays. Therefore, this ASEAN factor represents continu-
ing factor in the midst of changing factor represented by the existence 
of democracy and the incremental rising of nationalism. In Ambalat 
dispute, as explained later, this ASEAN Centrality factor becomes the 
most important control variable restraining firm responses not to de-
velop into open war.
ASEAN’s importance to Indonesia is the manifestation of President 
Suharto’s foreign policy aiming for stable and peaceful region. The 
principle came in the midst of various instability and potential mili-
tary conflicts in Southeast Asia, such as the abovementioned Indone-
sia-Malaysia confrontation in 1960s. For New Order regime, a stable 
and dynamic Southeast Asia provides conducive ground for Indone-
sia’s economic development, as well as recover its international repu-
tation by turning over the previously confrontational into a more be-
nign foreign policy. The vision was materialized in the establishment of 
ASEAN between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. In its development (including enlargement into 10 members 
nowadays), ASEAN proves to bring stability and peace in the region, 
including participates constructively in the settlement of Cambodian 
conflict. ASEAN has such an important role that it is regarded as the 
most progressive institution in the Asia Pacific.22
In the post-New Order era, the Indonesian government still regards 
ASEAN as its most convenient base for its activities in international 
relations. In fact, ASEAN enables Indonesia to interact with regional 
great powers confidently. It is an undeniable fact that Indonesia and its 
Southeast Asian fellows are actually group of small countries that can 
fall very easily into sphere of influence of the great powers, such as 
22  Mark Beeson, Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC, and Beyond (Rout-
ledge: London and New York, 2009), pp. 37-55
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China, Japan, the United States, Australia, and so on.23 It is interesting 
to discover that while ASEAN provides some kind of political ‘defence’ 
against those great powers, the great powers themselves feel convenient 
to hand on leadership role to them rather than to their rivals.
This systemic and geostrategic perception is then formulated to 
current political doctrine promoted by Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 
namely the Doctrine of Natalegawa. Named after Indonesian current 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, the doctrine basically 
describes the multipolarity in East Asia in which there are no single 
dominant power after the Cold War. Military tension is not a domi-
nant issue that it can appear alongside with economic and coordination 
issues. Such condition provides spaces for ASEAN to be the ‘center’ 
of the region (the so-called ASEAN Centrality Principle). Nowadays, 
there are so many iniatives taken with ASEAN as the center, such as the 
ASEAN+3, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ASEAN-Korea 
FTA, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZ FTA), ASEAN-
Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), and 
many others.24
It is assumed that such “ASEAN Centrality” principle would pro-
vide a distinct political prestige to Indonesia. Indonesia is regarded 
itself as ‘natural leader’ of ASEAN due to its leverage in geographi-
cal space, population, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Hence the 
ASEAN-led regionalism is commonly seen as a distinct advantage that 
Indonesia can enjoy. As the result, Indonesian foreign policy becomes 
very “pro-ASEAN” in its nature. In line with this, in almost all circum-
stances, Indonesia always shows its friendly ‘face’ and accomodation 
towards its neighbors in ASEAN.
In Ambalat dispute, this ASEAN Centrality factor seems not to be 
dominant in the first place. The principle cannot avoid military ma-
nouvers taken by the government, as if it is the democratic and na-
tionalism becoming the most relevant factors. However, the importance 
23  Alice D. Ba, “The Politics and Economics of ‘East Asia’ in China-ASEAN Rela-
tions”, in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (eds.), China and Southeast Asia: 
Global Changes and Regional Challenges (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p. 179
24  Syamsul Hadi, “Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of China: Indonesia in the Midst 
of East Asia’s Dynamics in the Post-global Crisis World”, in International Journal of 
China Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (August 2012), p. 160
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of ASEAN Centrality rests on the fact that Ambalat dispute never be-
comes an open war between Indonesia and Malaysia. By positioning it-
self as a leader advancing toward regional stability in ASEAN, an open 
war option with Malaysia in Ambalat dispute will deny what Indonesia 
promotes for so long. Concrete manifestation of this ASEAN Centrality 
Principle can be seen from responses of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. As the main promotor of this principle, it is no wonder to see 
that this ministry becomes the ultimate ASEAN defender. The minis-
try seemed to play only moderate role in the Ambalat issue. Differ-
ent from harsh stances by civil society, army, parliament, mass media, 
and even President SBY himself, Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed 
lenient measures by only delivering diplomatic note to Malaysia. Be-
tween 1998 to June 2009, it is reported that there were 36 notes sent by 
Indonesia.25 
Moreover, the ASEAN Centrality Principle gained more influence 
in the settlement of the dispute. By taking military manouvers in Am-
balat, Indonesian government actually had two options in mind: first, 
moving up the conflict into an open war, and second, moving down 
the strategy into diplomatic track. In the subsequent development, it 
is clear that the first option was never taken by the government. Un-
til now, there is no open war between Indonesia and Malaysia due to 
Ambalat issue. Therefore, the ASEAN Centrality Principle became the 
controlling variable determining the response not to be exaggerative. 
The influence of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very clear here as it 
stated that the dispute would never become a military war, as voiced by 
its spokesman:
...sikap RI terhadap pelanggaran wilayah yang dilakukan oleh Ma-
laysia di Blok Ambalat sebenarnya sudah cukup tegas yaitu dalam 
bentuk negosiasi dan patroli laut di wilayah kedaulatan kita. Pa-
troli laut adalah bentuk penegasan terhadap kepemilikan wilayah 
yang merujuk pada Konvensi Hukum Laut UNCLOS 1982...Jadi 
itulah ketegasan yang kita lakukan dan tidak bisa lebih dari itu, 
karena kita tidak berkeinginan untuk mengarah pada gunboat 
25  “Indonesia Kirim 36 Protes Soal Ambalat” (“Indonesia Sent 36 Protests Regard-
ing Ambalat”), last modified at 5 June 2009, retrieved from http://bisniskeuangan.
kompas.com/read/2009/06/05/13310731/Indonesia.Kirim.36.Protes.soal.Ambalat  at 
30 August 2013, 05:00 PM
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diplomacy atau penggelaran angkatan laut dan juga aktivitas 
yang menuju kepada suatu kekerasan. Hal itu yang kita hindari, 
karena kita mengedepankan negosiasi dan diplomasi, itu merupak-
an komitmen pemerintah yang sudah disampaikan oleh Presiden...26
...Indonesian response on Malaysia’s border violation in Ambalat 
block is sufficiently firm by conducting negotiation and sea patrols 
in our own sovereign area. Sea patrol reflects Indonesia’s firmness 
on territorial belonging refering to the UNCLOS 1982 Convention...
therefore, it is manifestation of our firmness and it cannot be 
more than that, since we have no intention to engage in gunboat 
diplomacy nor navy deployment as well as any violence activi-
ties. It is what we avoid, since we prefer negotiation and diplomacy, 
itself is the government’s commitment delivered by the president...
(bold is given by the author as emphasis)
The principle gives ‘limit’ on how far the military manouvers can 
go on the Ambalat dispute. Military manouver is allowed to be Indo-
nesia’s general response in the dispute as long as it is needed to meet 
the nationalist’ demand from domestic stakeholders. However in the 
next phase, Indonesian government decided to take diplomatic track 
and dialog to solve the issue. Bilateral diplomacy became prominent, as 
seen at 7 March 2005, when President SBY stated that both Indonesia 
and Malaysia committed to peacefully settle the Ambalat dispute. The 
statement was delivered after phone call between President SBY and 
Malaysian Prime Minister (PM) Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.27 Moreover, 
there was a meeting for ministry of foreign affairs at 9 March 2005, in 
which Indonesian Hassan Wirajuda dan Malaysian Sri Syeh Hamid Al-
bar explained and negotiated their stances on Ambalat dispute.28
26  “Sikap Pemerintah Tegas untuk Ambalat” (“Government is Firm on Ambalat”), in 
Tabloid Diplomasi, June 2009 Edition
27  “Presiden: PM Badawi Janjikan Cara Diplomasi Selesaikan Ambalat” (“President: 
PM Badawi Promised on Diplomacy to Resolve Ambalat”), at Kompas Daily News-
paper, 7 March 2005
28  “Indonesia Tidak Akan Bawa Kasus Ambalat ke ASEAN” (“Indonesia Will Not 
Bring Ambalat to ASEAN”), retrieved from http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasi-
onal/2005/03/08/brk,20050308-63,id.html at 29 October 2008, 8.00 PM
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Albar also met President SBY in the National Palace at 11 March 
2005. They agreed on the need of both parties to maintain good rela-
tions, both in governmental and military leader level.29 Another bilat-
eral diplomacy was conducted through Indonesia-Malaysia technical 
meeting regarding territorial dispute in Tanjung Benoa, Bali, 22-23 
March 2005.30 
Diplomacy and dialog are in accordance with the prevailing ASEAN 
norms in Southeast Asia, in which Indonesia tries to be its focal point. 
As part of regional ‘code of conduct’, nations here developed principle 
of Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Non-Violence. In Ambalat dis-
pute, diplomacy and dialog were shown by both parties through phone 
call between leaders, bilateral meeting, and technical meeting. More-
over, both Indonesia and Malaysia tried to implement the principle of 
‘ASEAN Way’ to settle dispute, i.e. by conducting consultation and 
consensus (musyawarah dan mufakat).31
All this activities drove towards intensifying dialogue between the 
two countries. The more the dialogues are, the more intensive the con-
fidence building measures between the conflicting parties, so that the 
settlement will be likely more constructive and responsible. No matter 
how robust the emotional pressures are, including the growing national-
ism surrounding Ambalat dispute, in the end it is the engrained tradition 
in ASEAN, founded by Indonesia itself, to become determining vari-
able gradually changed the course of the conflict from confrontation to 
dialogue and cooperation. The factor went along with the intention of 
both parties to restrain themselves, as well as the emergence of other 
domestic issues in Indonesia, such as corruption, cabinet reshuffle, ter-
rorist arrests, and so forth that made the Ambalat dispute old-fashioned.
29  “Sembilan Blok Minyak Rawan Sengketa” (“9 Oil Blocks Are Vulnerable to Ter-
ritorial Dispute”), in Koran Tempo Daily Newspaper, 12 March 2005
30  “Tim Perunding Deplu-RI untuk Kasus Ambalat Didukung Lima Penasihat” (“In-
donesian Ministry Foreign Affairs’ Negotiating Team Are Supported by 5 Advisers”), 
retrieved from http://www.IndonesIa-1.com/konten.php?nama=news&op=detaIl_
news&Id=271    at 29 October 2008, 8:22 PM
31  Besides these three principle, ASEAN also has ‘non-interference in domestic af-
fairs’ and ‘mutual respect for sovereignty of all nations’. See at Amitav Acharya, 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 48
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V. CONCLUSION
Indonesian foreign policy in the Post-New Order era seems to be 
more complex than in the previous era. In the New Order, Indonesian 
foreign policy was more elitist as the result of authoritarian political 
system. However in the Post-New Order era, there is an interaction be-
tween changing and continuing factors in the policy’s decision making 
process. As seen in Ambalat dispute, changing factors are represented 
by democracy, e.g. through the emergence of plural actors commit-
ting to their own interests and colliding with one another to determine 
the outcome of a policy. Changing factors are also represented by the 
growing nationalism resulting from frustation due to long-standing do-
mestic problems. Meanwhile, continuity is represented by the ASEAN 
Centrality Principle promoted by the ministry of foreign affairs. In one 
hand, democracy and nationalism have contributed to the government’s 
firm stances through the sending of military force in Ambalat, while 
in the other hand, “ASEAN Centrality” principle became a controlling 
variable resisting the dispute not to be an open war. 
In the different view, Indonesian foreign policy in the Ambalat dis-
pute should be put in historical context. Ambalat is a good example 
showing public participation and pressure in determining foreign poli-
cy. However, such ‘responsiveness’ and ‘aspirative behaviour’ were by 
no means the product of unique political context at that time, in which 
public frustation due to long-standing domestic unresolved issues (such 
as economic crisis, separatism, territorial dispute, cultural claim, and 
migrant workers) have revived the nationalism, especially at grassroots 
level.
It means that the ‘aspirative’ trend of Indonesian foreign policy 
seems not to be persistent nor repetitive. In other cases, along with the 
changing priority, economic, social, and political context, the policy 
trend can develop into its initial format, i.e. ‘elitist’ and ‘at a distance 
with the public’. At least, it appeared again on Bintan Island incident in 
2010 as mentioned in the beginning of the writing, in which Indonesian 
government took lenient stance by only sending diplomatic notes. Dur-
ing this time, factos such as the peaceful solution in Aceh, economic 
recilience during the global crisis 2008-2009, domestic political sta-
bility, and Indonesia’s chairmanship in ASEAN 2011 have made the 
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government cultivate good image and confidence enabling it to take 
completely different stances than in the Ambalat. Indonesian minister 
of foreign affairs, Marti Natalegawa, even frankly stated that Indonesia 
is widely expected to give good example in the Bintan Island incident 
as Indonesia would chair ASEAN in 2011.
However, the Ambalat dispute indeed showed that in particular mo-
ment and case, the post-New Order Indonesian foreign policy is more 
dynamic and ‘massive’ in its nature. In one hand, Ambalat dispute 
clearly showed that public emotion contributed to the heating public 
discourse, making the case largely discussed. The factor met with po-
litical behavior and elite’s interest, in which President SBY saw the dis-
pute as an advantage to cultivate public support. But in the other hand, 
perception that Indonesia should give good example on inter-nations 
dispute settlement, as the consequence of Indonesia’s intention to re-
main acknowledged as “ASEAN leader”, has made all bustles stop as 
mere rethorics. In its diplomacy, Indonesia still seek pacific settlement 
and avoid violence measures in this interesting territorial dispute. 
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